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SPAMMER DETECTION IN SOCIAL BOOKMARKING SYSTEMS
SUMMARY
One of the the biggest technological developments of the recent century is probably
the Internet. It has brought together people from all corners of the world with different
cultures. Millions of users pass their time to read, learn, research or to do business
using the internet. The need of users for organize their favourite resources make
companies to serve services which resulting organizing or sharing of their resources
efficiently. This lead to the development of what is currently known as "social
bookmarking" sites that have taken the internet world by storm. Bookmarking systems
enable users to store, organize and search their resources. Furthermore, a social
bookmarking system allows users to share their resources with others and even join
groups of people with similar interests.
The data size in social bookmarking systems has been increased sharply in recent years
with the usage of such systems. The importance of data in these systems is due to their
data type which is filtered by users. Then they can be a good source for the search
engines and help them to easily figure out the contents of Web pages. In addition of
understanding the Web contents directly, these social bookmarking systems also help
search engines to rank the Web pages too.
However, such systems attract spammers due to their ease of use and popularity.
Spammers have started misleading search engines and other bookmarking system users
in order to direct Web traffic towards their own pages. To make their pages more visible
they use different techniques in order to mislead search engines. They are also aware
of filters in the bookmarking systems and mostly act as normal users or change their
activity type time to time to deceive the spam detection filters.
Strong prevention and detection methods in social bookmarking systems are
indispensable in order to stop spam activities and guaranty the accuracy and reliability
of information. The on-line and real time techniques of detection and prevention would
be more efficient. In the literature there are some methods which introduced to combat
with this problem. Some of these techniques focus on just posts of users where some
others try to understand the spam activity by consideration of users treatment in the
system. Directly referring to the resources to realize their contents would be very
time consuming and finding spammers on post levels or user levels are more accepted.
In both of these levels different techniques are available. Finding spam features and
classifying users as spam/non-spam base on those features is one of them. Semantic
analysis of social bookmarking systems is the other proposed technique. Here Spam
detection is done by semantic analysing the users activity or analysing the relations
between users in the system and also semantically analysing their posts.
Here in this thesis, we have a review on works in the literature related toward this
problem. In most of those researches semantic analysis of the system has been
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considered. However some others worked on finding the efficient features for spam
detection task.
In this work, we first introduce a novel framework for spam detection task in social
bookmarking systems . Here, we propose a set of new features to improve the accuracy
of spammer detection. Our experiments show that our features demonstrate a high
discriminative power. Next we modify and use a semantic technique to improve the
results of our proposed spam detection method.
A performance evaluation of our proposed method over other spammer detection
methods indicate that the proposed model yields an improvement of the prediction
accuracy.
xx
SOSYAL I˙MLEME SI˙STEMLERI˙NDE I˙STENMEYEN
KULLANICILARI BELI˙RLEME
ÖZET
Sosyal imleme sistemleri, Web kullanıcılarına, kaynaklarını depolama, organize etme
ve bu kaynakların içinde arama yapma olunag˘ı sunmaktadır. Buna ek olarak, bu
sistemler, kullanıcılarına, Web üzerinde depolanmıs¸ kaynaklarını, dig˘er kullanıcılarla
paylas¸ma fırsatı da sunmaktadır. Bu kullanıcılar, sosyal imleme sitelerinde ortak
ilgi alanlarına göre çes¸itli gruplara üye olup, aktivitelerde bulunabilirler. Sosyal
imleme veya benzer sistemlerin yaygın olmasının nedeni çevrimiçi çalıs¸maları ve
kolay kullanılabilmeleridir. Kullanıcılar herhangi bir yerden internete bag˘lanarak,
hesaplarına ulas¸abilir ve yönetebilirler. Bu sistemlerde dil kısıtlaması olmadıg˘ı
için, kullanıcılar istedikleri dilde etiketleme yapabilmektedir. Son dönemlerde, bu
sistemlerin yaygın kullanımıyla beraber büyük bir veri hacmi olus¸mus¸tur. Bu verilerin
en önemli tarafı gerçek kullanıcılar tarafından üretilmis¸ olmalarıdır. Bundan dolayı
Web arama motorları için zengin kaynak olus¸turmaktadırlar. Arama motorlarının
onlara gönderilen sorguları cevaplayabilmeleri için internet sayfalarını önceden
depolamaları gerekmektedir. Bir sorgu sonucu olarak sayfaları olus¸turmaları da
kelimeler sayesinde olmaktadır. Burada “Index” adı verilen listelerde Web sayfalarında
geçen kelimeler tutulmaktadır. Böylece arama motorları sadece bu listeyi belleklerinde
tutmakta ve zamanla genis¸letmektedirler. Onlara gelen sorguları da bu indekslere
bakarak cevaplamaktadırlar. Aslında söz konusu olan sosyal imleme sistemlerinde
de kullanıcılar tarafından sayfalara verilen etiketler, indeks olarak kabul edilebilir. Bu
etiketlerin gerçek kullanıcılar tarafından verilmesi, arama motorlarına bu bilgileri de
kullanarak kullanıcıya dog˘ru sayfalar sunma olanag˘ı sag˘lamaktadır. Web ortamının
her bir alanında istenmeyen aktiviteler görülebilmektedir. Bu aktivitelere en belirgin
örnek istenmeyen elektronik mektuplardır. Bu mektupların içerig˘ini çog˘unlukla satıs¸
amaçlı reklamlar olus¸turmaktadır. Aslında istenmeyen aktivitelerin çog˘unun amacı
satıs¸ yapmaktır ve Web ortamı da bunun için müsait ve ucuz bir ortamdır. Sosyal
imleme sistemlerine olan ilginin artması ve arama motorlarının da bu sistemlerdeki
bilgileri kullanmalarının bir yan etkisi de "istenmeyen kullanıcı" olarak deg˘erlendirilen
kullanıcı sayısının artmasıdır. Sosyal imleme sistemlerinin kolayca kullanılabiliyor
olması da istenmeyen kullanıcıların bu sistemlerde daha rahat aktivite göstermelerine
yol açmıs¸tır. Yapılan aras¸tırmalara göre istenmeyen kullanıcıların temel amaçlarından
biri, Web ortamı ve sosyal ag˘lardaki veri trafig˘ini kendi olus¸turdukları kaynaklara
yöneltmektir. Bu dog˘rultuda, bu kullanıcılar, Web ortamındaki arama motorlarını
ve sosyal imleme sisteminin dig˘er kullanıcılarını hedef yapıp, yanlıs¸ yönlendirerek
amaçlarına ulas¸ma çabasındadırlar. Bu arada istenmeyen kullanıcılar, sosyal imleme
sistemlerindeki uygulanan filtrelerin farkına varıp, kendilerini normal kullanıcı olarak
tanıtmaktadırlar. Genellikle istenmeyen kullanıcılar, kendilerine özel sayfaları normal
veya popüler sayfa göstermekte ve aynı zamanda filtrelere yakalanmayacak s¸ekilde
deg˘is¸ik kullanıcı isimleri kullanmaktadırlar. Bu tip aktiviteler, Web ortamının ve
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sosyal imleme sistemlerindeki verinin akıs¸ını ve güvenilirlig˘ini tehlikeye atmaktadır.
O yüzden, güçlü bir istenmeyen kullanıcı bulma ve önleme sistemine ihtiyaç
duyulmaktadır. Genellikle bu önleme sistemleri üç deg˘is¸ik yöntem kullanılmaktadır.
Bu seviyeler kes¸if, alt sınıfa indirme veya önleme olarak adlandırılır. Bulma veya
kes¸if yöntemleri kullanıcıların katkısı ve makina ög˘renme tekniklerine dayalıdır. Bu
seviyedeki kes¸if is¸lemleri kullanıcı bazında, kaynak bazında veya etiket bazında
yapılmaktadır. Bu çalıs¸mada, güvenilir bir istenmeyen kullanıcı bulma ve önleme
sistemi sunulmaktadır.
Bu çalıs¸mada, güvenilir bir istenmeyen kullanıcı bulma ve önleme sistemi
sunulmaktadır. Burada önerilen istenmeyen kullanıcıları belirleme ve önleme sistemi
de kes¸if seviyesinde olup, makine ög˘renme tekniklerine dayanmaktadır. Genelde
makine ög˘renme tekniklerinin amacı geçmis¸teki verileri kullanarak yeni gelen örnekler
için tahminlerde bulunmak ve onları kapsayan örüntülere yakınsamaktır. Bu çalıs¸mada
ise önceden belirgin olan normal ve istenmeyen kullanıcıların davranıs¸larını dikkate
alınacak, test kümelerindeki belirsiz kullanıcılar makine ög˘renme teknikleri kullanarak
sınıflandırılmaktadır. Çalıs¸ma kaynak, kullanıcı ve etiket bazında yapılarak iki
as¸amadan olus¸maktadır. I˙lk as¸amada ayırd edici özelliklerle istenmeyen aktiviteler
belirlenmeye çalıs¸ılmıs¸tır. Sosyal imleme sistemlerinin sag˘ladıg˘ı örüntü örnekleri,
genel olarak, is¸lenmemis¸ bir biçimde sunulmaktadır ve ayırd edici özelliklere
sahip olmamaktadır. Bu yüzden, veri madencilig˘i yöntemlerini kullanarak, sunulan
verilerden, ayırd edici özelliklere sahip olan nitelikler çıkarmak, sistem açısından
önemli bir as¸amadır. Bu çalıs¸mada, veri için yüksek ayırd edici özelliklere sahip
olan yeni nitelikler ortaya koyulmus¸tur. Bu nitelikler zaman ve katılım bazındaki
incelemelerden ortaya çıkmıs¸tır. Bir sosyal imleme sistemindeki kullanıcıların zaman
içinde o sisteme yaptıg˘ı giris¸ ve çıkıs¸lar gözlemlenmis¸, oturum bazında ayırılmıs¸tır.
Her bir oturum, içerisinde pes¸ pes¸e yapılan etiketlemelerin arası 30 dakikayı (es¸ik
deg˘er) geçmeyecek s¸ekilde düs¸ünülmüs¸tür. Kullanıcıların oturumlardaki davranıs¸ları
izlenmis¸, bazı istenmeyen kullanıcıların deg˘is¸ik kullanıcı isimleri kullanarak, aynı
saatte tek bir kaynag˘ı etiketleyerek sistemi yükledikleri gözlemlenmis¸tir. Bu davranıs¸
bir istenmeyen kullanıcı davranıs¸ı oldug˘undan, sistemdeki kullanıcıların sistemi
yükleme oranları ölçülmüs¸tür. I˙mleme sisteminde, kullanıcıların sık etiketlemeleri
sonucunda bazı Web kaynakları o etiket içerig˘i için referans kaynak duruma gelmis¸tir.
Bu referans sayfaların ziyaretçi sayısı da artarak, o konuyu aras¸tıran dig˘er kullanıcılar
da zamanla o sayfaya yönlenmis¸tir. I˙stenmeyen kullanıcılar ise kendi sayfalarını
referans veya popüler göstermek amacıyla o sayfaları deg˘is¸ik kullanıcı isimleriyle
etiketlemektedir. Bu etiketleme aynı saatte oldug˘u zaman, sistemi fazla yükleme
filtresine yakalanmaktadır. Ancak deg˘is¸ik saatlerde yapılan etiketlemeler bu filtreyi
devre dıs¸ı bırakmaktadır. Bu nedenle de ikinci bir filtre olması gerekmektedir.
Bu amaçla kullanıcıların paylas¸ım oranlarını ölçerek, paylas¸ım yüklenmesi olarak
adlandırdıg˘ımız kavram ortaya çıkmıs¸tır. Az sayıda kullanıcı toplulug˘unun çok büyük
sayıda kaynak etiketlemeleri veya aksine çok sayıda kullanıcı toplulug˘unun az sayıda
kaynak etiketlemeleri, ve kaynakların gerçek olmayan güven oranını yükseltmek, bir
istenmeyen aktivite göstergesidir. Bu nedenle kullanıcıların paylas¸ım oranlarını ölçme
fikriyle ikinci bir filtre yapılmıs¸tır. Zaman ve paylas¸ım gibi kavramlardan çıkartılan
ayırd edici özellikler bu çalıs¸manın ilk as¸amasını olus¸tururken, ikinci as¸amada da
kullanılmaktadır. Sadece ayırd edici özellikleri kullanarak sistemdeki istenmeyen
kullanıcıların çog˘unun tanımlanması imkansızdır. Bu nedenle bu çalıs¸manın ikinci
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kısmında, anlamsal yöntemler kullanılmıs¸tır. Aslında anlamsal yöntemler bundan
öncede bu tür problemlerin çözülmesinde iyi performans göstermis¸lerdir.
I˙mleme sistemlerini anlamsal olarak incelemekten kasıt, kullanıcıların, kaynakların
ve etiketlerin arasındaki bag˘lantıların incelenmesidir. Literatürde bu sistemlerin
anlamsal olarak incelenmesi için deg˘is¸ik yöntemler önerilmis¸tir. Bizim tercih
ettig˘imiz yöntem ise çok hızlı çalıs¸an ve zaman içeresinde az deg˘is¸im gerektiren bir
yöntemdir. I˙mleme sistemleri yeni gelen kullanıcılara açıktır ve kullanıcı sayıları
da gün geçtikçe artmaktadır. Yeni kullanıcılar, kaynaklar ve etiketler eklenirken,
istenmeyen kullnıcıları önleme sisteminin az miktarda deg˘is¸ime ug˘raması büyük bir
avantajdır. Öte yandan daha önce belirttig˘imiz gibi istenmeyen kullanıcıların zaman
içinde davranıs¸ deg˘is¸tirmeleri nedeniyle, yeni gelis¸en davranıs¸ların da anlas¸ılması
gerekmektedir. Sistemdeki tüm kullanıcıların aktiviteleri, bag˘lantıları ve davranıs¸
deg˘is¸imlerini anlamak için o sistemin tüm yapısına hakim olunması gerekmektedir.
Tüm bu gereksinimleri gözden geçirerek anlamsal inceleme kısmında "Trust Rank
yöntemi" adıyla anılan ikinci çerçeve için seçilmis¸tir.
"Trust Rank" yönteminde kullanıcıların bag˘ımlılıkları ortak kaynak veya ortak
etiketler veya bas¸ka ortak özelliklerle ölçülüp, bir benzerlik matrisi olus¸turulur.
Sistemdeki belirgin normal ve istenmeyen kullanıcılar ise çekirdek dizisinde yer
alır. Çekirdek dizide normal kullanıcılar pozitif ve istenmeyen kullanıcılar negatif
ve test kullanıcıları ise sıfır olarak yerles¸tirilmis¸tir. Bu formül çalıs¸tırıldıktan
sonra test kullanıcılarının normal veya istenmeyen kullanıcı olup olmadıkları
belirlenir. Bu da test kullanıcılarının hangi oranla normal veya istenmeyen
kullanıcılarla bag˘lantılı olmalarına dayanmaktadır. Bu çalıs¸mada "Trust Rank"
yönteminin temel unsurları olarak tanımlanan çekirdek dizisi ve benzerlik matrisi
üzerinde iyiles¸tirmeler yapılmıs¸tır. Çekirdek dizideki belirgin kullanıcıların boyutunu
azaltmak için destek vektör makinelerinin kullanmasını önerilmis¸tir. Kullanıcıların
birinci as¸amada önerilen ayırd edici özelliklerinin deg˘erleri üzerinden destek vektör
makineleri çıkarılmıs¸ ve çekirdek dizide bu vektörlerin kullanılmasıyla dizinin boyutu
küçülmüs¸tür. Bu dizinin küçülmesi zaman ve yer karmas¸ıklıg˘ı konusunda iyiles¸me
anlamına gelmektedir. Ayrıca benzerlik matrisinin olus¸turulmasında sadece kaynaklar
deg˘il o kaynakların sunucuları kullanılmıs¸tır. Bu deg˘is¸im kullanıcılar arasındaki
benzerlig˘i arttırdıg˘ı için daha dog˘ru sonuçlar vermis¸tir. Sistemde bazı kullanıcılar
hep izole oldug˘undan, benzerlik yöntemi ile çekirdek diziden onlara ulas¸ılmamaktadır.
Bu nedenle kullanıcılar arasında en ideal bag˘lantıyı kurmak için, kosinüs benzerlig˘i
kullanılmıs¸tır. Önerilen birinci ve ikinci çerçevelerde sunulan yöntemler üzerinde
testler yapılmıs¸, bu yöntemlerin istenmeyen kullanıcıların belirlenmesinde etkili
oldukları ispatlanmıs¸tır.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Web 2.0 activated several popular applications which Social Bookmarking (SB)
systems are one of them. They allow users to annotate keywords or tags for Web
resources that are of interest to them, helping them to organize, share and easily keep
track of these resources. Thus bookmarking systems are provenance of manually
filtered resource collections which are highly qualified and trustful data sources.
Yusuke et al. express the importance of these data sources for search engines and
investigate the usefulness of SB systems for the purpose of enhancing Web search [1].
Being an optimization source for search engines and at the same time ease of use of
bookmarking systems inspire spammers to penetrate in such systems. Beside their
advantages, these systems are vulnerable to spam activities [2]. Spam pages are full
of advertisements or have absurd contents which are not notable for other users in the
system. In order to direct the traffic to spam resources, spammers implement different
techniques. Employing incorrect tagging literature is one of them. For example the
words "Microsoft" or "taxonomy" are not related to the pornographic Web pages but
spammers use such type of popular tags to mislead search engines or to increase the
number of visitors of their own pages. The more new bookmarks and tags appear, the
more difficult it becomes to control the spam activity in the SB systems. Preservation of
data quality demands automatic and efficient techniques of identifying and excluding
spammers in such systems. Normally these techniques rummage posts of a user or
the user activities to identify traces of a spam. The spam detection techniques can
be categorised into some major strategies including detection-based strategies [3].
Detection-based strategies try to detect spam by investigating the profile information of
users, analysing the bookmark sharing mechanisms or analysing relationships between
elements of system in order to determine if some resources or bookmarks are behaving
unnaturally. Previous studies show that semantic analysis on users tagging behaviour
has encouraging results on spam detection [4,5]. A number of various detection-based
strategies, based on semantic approaches exists as well. However, some of these
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methods are not able to determine a user as a spammer since they operate on a level
which is independent from the user itself and is more dependent on the user activity,
say tags. Hence, they can only mark the data provided by users and not the user itself as
spam or non-spam (post level spam detection). Moreover, as a consequence of focusing
on the data provided by the users instead of the user behaviour, the system is more and
more exposed to the risk of missing new spam techniques. This is due to the fact
that spammers can suddenly change their tagging behaviour for which some semantic
methods are either deceived or require an entire re-structuring in order to be able to
serve the new threat. There are some other semantic techniques which sift the user
activities, posts and different relations between system elements to directly determine
spammers (user level spam detection). In order to decrease the risk of behaviour
changing by spammers, having a complete history of users and their relations would
be more efficient. Having such a complete view makes it possible to review some
suspicious users in the future without any need to re-structuring the SB system. In this
work our aim is to implement a semantic technique which provides us such a complete
view. Our spam detection tasks here, can be categorized in two main groups:
1. Feature generation First we introduce a novel framework for spammer detection in
SB systems. We propose a set of new features extracted from monitoring user
activity for spam detection. These features are not restricted to bookmarking
systems and can be employed in any collaborative system. Our investigations
suggest that user behaviour affects the resources in the sense that each time a
resource is tagged, the log information, bound to that resource is changed (A
resource log contains information on access statistics). In this stage, we calculate a
statistical score to each of our proposed features. This is done for every user in the
system. Based on these scores one can employ various classification techniques to
assign spammer/non-spammer labels to those users.
2. Semantic analysis of SB system In order to utilization of high discriminative power
of semantic techniques we continue our work by using Trust Rank method. We
choose this method here due to the comprehensive picture that it provides from
the system in order to decrease the risks of semantic methods which we described
above. Trust Rank is based on page-rank concept which is a critical parameter used
2
by search engines for recommending proper Web pages in response to a user query.
It contains parameters like transition matrix and seed vectors. Values assigned to
these structures play a key role on the performance of the Trust Rank method. In this
thesis, we have improved a recent semantic spammer detection approach, based on
Trust Rank methodology, by modifying the transition matrix and seed vectors (the
elements of Trust Rank). In order to improve the seed vectors we have employed
our novel feature set. Moreover, we used this feature set to find a better transition
matrix.
In this work, we have utilized the bibsonomy dataset which was introduced in
the ECML/PKDD 2008 discovery challenge [9] on tag recommendation and spam
detection in SB systems. In a comparative study, we compared our approach to similar
works on the same dataset and it has been shown that our method outperforms other
approaches in terms of accuracy. Our experiments show that the proposed feature set
acts as a filter that helps a fast and real time detection of spam resources. Also we use
this feature set to construct a better seed vector as well as a better transition matrix for
semantic analysis phase.
1.1 Literature Review
Popularity of SB systems propels people to investigate and acknowledge others about
use of such systems. These systems are growing day by day and turn to be a huge
source of valuable and trustful data. Data stream from SB systems helps search engines
to better evaluate the quality of Web sites [6]. The ease of use of SB systems and
their influence on optimisation of search engines make them attractive to spammers.
Often spammers, in order to direct more Web traffic to their own pages misuse SB
systems by inappropriate posting behaviour. Zoltan and Hector [7] demonstrate that
the objective of a search engine is to provide highly qualified results by investigating
all Web pages. In addition they noted the impact of spam on search engines as well.
They also predicate spam to any deliberate Web activity that intends to change the
relevance or importance of a Web page comparing to the true value of that page [7].
This definition is very compatible with the spam activity species in SB systems where
spammers try to increase the visibility of their own resources. Recently preserving
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reliable data in SB systems demands spam combating which has been regarded as the
urgent problem in such systems. Paul Heymann et al. [3] have surveyed approaches
for spam detection on social Web pages. They search on potential solutions for
spam detection on social Web sites, and, by doing so, compare and contrast those
with prior solutions to e-mail and Web spam. Wetzker et al. [2] enumerate spam
activity symptoms in SB systems as very high activity, very low activity, high tagging
rate, low tagging rate and combinations of them. However, spammers show frequent
change of activity symptoms, and while doing that, they show similarity to normal
users from time to time. On the other hand, sometimes even normal users show the
same symptoms as spammers. According to these facts, one should develop a set of
discriminative methods which groups the users into spammers and non-spammers even
when they show similar symptoms. One of the classical methods of spam detection
at the Web is finding discriminative features ( [8], [9] and [10]). Krause et al. [10]
represented some features by using profile, location and activity information of users
for spam detection in SB systems. Markines et al. [9] express that spam can be injected
into a tagging system at three different levels: User, Post and Resource levels. At user
level, we are dealing with the interaction of a user with the system. At post level
we are dealing with the relevancy of tags to resources. Finally, at the resource level
the relevancy of the resource contents is considered. Then spam detection techniques
are mainly implemented by considering user’s activities (user level spam detection) or
tagging behaviour (post level spam detection) or directly consider the resources of each
user (resources level spam detection). They also mentioned that the appropriate level
of resolution for classifying spam is often the post level (tag-resource associations).
Similar manner of finding and implementing different features to filter spammers on
post level can be seen in [4], [5], [11], [12] and [13]. At post level evaluation, mostly
semantic methods have been employed. Data preparation in semantic scale demands
high precision and is a time consuming work [5], [14]. The traditional structure of such
collaborative filtering systems is based on a graphical model which consists of users,
tags and resources as graph nodes. The edges of the graph represent a relationship
between the nodes in terms of dependency. Experts use this model to investigate and
describe the relationship between graph nodes by assigning weights to the edges of the
graph. These weights, are an indication of how strong that dependency is. In case of
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post level spam detection these weights are computed based on the semantic analysis
of tags provided by the users. The likelihood of a user to be labelled as a spammer is
directly proportional to the number of resources and tags that this user has in common
with spammers. Thus semantic evaluation of user behaviour requires high amount of
bookmarks per user and these techniques don’t produce good quality prediction for
users with few amounts of bookmarks [4]. In such evaluations, arrival of each new
user or tag not only demands subjoining of new relations to the preliminary graph but
also sometimes requires deep updates on the values of existing edges as well.
In another study, a technique is proposed which combines classification and clustering
for spam detection task [14]. Although good results are achieved, the proposed model
in [14] demonstrates a poor performance when a new user adds a post to the system. In
their model, for every new user in the system, there is a need to repeat all the clustering
and classification steps. This is a very time consuming and computationally expensive
process. One has to note that SB systems are subjective to an ever increasing number
of new users. It would be much more reasonable and practical to provide a real-time
discrimination technique in such systems. While post level spam detection methods
have shown progressive results, still there is a need to improve these methods.
5
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2. BACKGROUND
2.1 Basics of Folksonomy and Social Bookmarking Systems
The term Web 2.0, was first used by Tim O’Reilly in 2004. It describes a "cluster
of Web-based services with a social collaboration and sharing component, where
the community as a whole contributes, takes control, votes and ranks content and
contributors". Web 2.0 services include social networking sites, wikis, communication
tools, Web blogs, social bookmarking, social software, and folksonomies.
2.1.1 Folksonomy
In the early years of the Web, directory services were utilized in order to arrange
the Web. These services were usually directed manually and filtered page collections
seldom contained low quality contents. The task of manually selecting useful resources
was done by a group of professional editors and due to this human intervention the
emerging information sources were considered to be very trustful. A rapid growth
of the Web, made this approach impractical due to the scale of data which should be
analysed. There was a void of new method for selecting and categorizing these huge
amount of Web pages. In late 2003 del.icio.us website as an online bookmark manager
was emerged [15]. The ability to assign tags to the URLs, using a non-hierarchical
keyword categorization system was appended in early 2004 by emergence of the
Web 2.0 concept. This ability makes it possible to find and categorize Web pages
by the users whom are aware of the contents of Web pages. Tagging was quickly
replicated by other social software and in late 2004 the Folksonomy name, was coined
by Thomas Vander Wal [16]. Folksonomy is obtained via free tagging of objects and
information by users. In the literature a folksonomy is a tuple F = (U,T,R,Y ) where
U , T and R are finite sets of users {u1,u2,u3, ...}, tags {t1, t2, t3, ...} and resources
{r1,r2,r3, ...} respectively and Y ⊆ U × T × R. The elements of Y are called tag
assignments or TAS briefly. For example in Figure 2.1 user1 and user2 bookmarked url
7
Figure 2.1: Bookmarking example.
”http : //www.plus2net.com/sqltutorial/second−highest.php” by different
tag sets as Taguser1={ mysql,sql } and Taguser2={ sql, mysql, query, highest, database
} in del.icio.us SB system. The major advantage of SB systems over Web directories is
that in SB systems an individual has the ability to store access points to some selected
resources externally. Thus, the user community as a whole is able to manually arrange
the Web in a bottom-up manner. One other advantage is that, in SB system, in contrast
to bookmarking on a personal browser, a bookmark affects the whole community of
users. SB systems use to inform their users about popular pages with highest recent
bookmarks. Users can also subscribe to activity reporting services which when used
as a feedback, enables the community to obtain information about useful pages which
attract a rapid growth of attention. Moreover, users are allowed to assign keywords or
tags to pages. This enables the search engines to easily extract the pages tagged by a
specific keyword. Also the community benefits from tags in the sense that each user
can easily extract and employ relative tags to find a resource in the system. However,
tags do not follow a controlled vocabulary and are mainly based on the agreement
among users as to how to describe and tag a certain resource. In the literature one
can find different SB systems with various resource types. For each SB system the
term resource bears different meanings depending on the scope in which a SB system
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Table 2.1: Social bookmarking sites.
Site Name Description
BibSonomy Researchers use this system to share the bookmarks and
bibliographies
del.icio.us It allows users to easily add favourite urls to their personal
collection of links and to categorize those resources with tags
Digg It is a social news Website. Lets users to vote news up or
down.
BlueDot This basic social networking service allows users to save
and share bookmarks
is focused. For instance in the case of del.icio.us bookmarking system, a resource is
considered to be a Web site, while in the case of CiteULike, it is an academic paper [17]
and in the case of flickr it is an photo. Some known SB systems have been shown in
table 2.1. SB systems, like any other engineered system, has some disadvantages as
well. The following two sub-sections, enlist their advantages and disadvantages from
a technical perspective rather than a historic one.
2.1.2 Advantages
• Accessibility: The best factor about SB websites is that they are not limited to one
computer, they are accessible from anywhere where internet is in reach.
• Human Interaction: Almost every person that surfs the Web finds an exciting
resource and shares it with others through revealing the address of the website that
they find amazing.
• Trust: Some internet marketers have earned a strong reputation during the time.
When they suggest a website through bookmarking, users follow them. This results
in huge turnout to some resources and as a consequence the revenue of the site
owners increases. Moreover, in order to profit from this huge market, users don’t
even have to be site owners. This is where the fourth advantage emerges.
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• Search Engine Misleading: SB makes highly effective back-links to a website
which will help increasing the ranking on the major search engines. Bookmarking
systems offer a plus for external link building as the main search engines favour
sites with such links directing to them.
2.1.3 Disadvantages
• Tag structure: No specific standard exists on how to produce and manage tag links.
A standard like this may contain protocols on how to capitalize start letters of tags
or how to deal with synonyms.
• Search Engine Optimization: While an advantage, creating back-links to websites
with no rich content and attempting to direct Web traffic to such a link in order to
increase ranking is a trend that needs to be avoided.
2.2 Spam
Generally, spam can be defined as any type of unwanted or irrelevant communication
via the Web. The earliest and yet the most common type of spam is email spam and
the main motivation behind it is money. With growing volumes of spam traffic, the
receiver and their platform will need more network and storage resources to adapt to
the extra load. This results in further costs while the only thing that the spammers
require is simply a broadband internet connection to send their spam.
2.3 Spam In Folksonomies
With the evolution of the internet, new types of spam emerges in almost all Web
applications and the folksonomies are not an exception. Spammers started to use the
bookmarking systems and their services as a playground for their activities. Usually,
they pursue two main goals when injecting resources in the SB systems: First attracting
other users to their advertising pages and second misleading search engines to their
own pages. This is mainly motivated by financial goals. The first step to stop, filter
and prevent various spam activities is the analysis of the environment. Understanding
the motivation of an spammer who wants to penetrate in this environment has a key
role.
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As mentioned above, one of the major advantages of these systems is the ease of use
which can turn to be a disadvantage at the same time since the system would be an easy
target for spammers as well. On the other hand misleading of search engines attracts
so many spammers to these systems. As Markines et al. describes in [9] "the structure
of these systems is entirely user-driven with no more control, and a malicious user can
exploit this control to make some content more prominent, drive user traffic to chosen
targets, and in general to pollute the folksonomy". This type of spam is referred to as
social spam. These type of pollution not only deceives other users but also directs the
search engines to the wrong resources as well.
2.4 Combating with Spam
There are different spam detection and prevention techniques in the literature. Paul
Heymann et al. [3] have a survey on spam detection in social Web pages. Their study
results in a categorization of spam combating strategies. In their work, three main
anti-spam strategies in practice are demonstrated for which a brief description is given
below.
• Identification-Based (Detection)
Identification-based methods proceed in two phases. In the first phase, spam(mer)
is identified either manually by the users or by employing a classification method
controlled by the system administrator. The second phase deals with the spam
likelihood. Based on this likelihood, the system interface either delete the spam
and compute the results or displays particular results as likely spam.
• Rank-Based (Demotion)
Demotion methods usually construct a list of available resources and assign a high
rank to resources with low spam likelihood. In these systems, resources with higher
ranks are placed above other resources. Hence, the visibility of resources with high
spam likelihood is decreased.
• Interface- or- Limit- Based (Prevention)
Prevention methods try to restrict spam content contribution. At the design stage,
the designer has the option to limit the access to critical system information as well
as automated interactions.
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Identification based works have three granularity levels in spam detection, namely
user-level, post-level, and tag-level detection.
• User level: In user level detection, a user is detected and flagged as spammer
according to his/her behaviour and postings. The tags he/she posted are then treated
as spams and will not be popularized to others. Since most of the spammers will
intentionally post tag spams, flagging and prohibiting them is effective to prevent
spam tags. However, the detection of spammers is not so easy and manual flagging
is often needed.
• Post level: Post-level scheme identifies individual spams from each post by any
users. In this scheme, users are considered to post spams, no matter intentionally or
not. When a post is identified as spam, all tags in this post are spams.
• Resource level: In the resource level investigation the content of resources has
been considered mostly which is very time consuming and impossible practically
because of high number of resources in the SB systems. In this thesis, our method
is able to flag some resources as spam or non-spam without controlling the contents
of these resources. This is done by investigating the style with which a resource is
being used by a user.
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3. METHODOLOGY
To solve a spam problem in SB systems perfectly, we should have information about
different types of spam activity. We performed a massive investigation throughout
our data set and by considering spammer’s activities categorized them into two main
groups:
1. Saboteur users: These type of spammers tag a huge number of documents in order
to decrease the performance of a SB systems.
2. Propagandist users: These type of spammers focus on techniques to rise the
visibility of their own resource.
The main aim of this thesis is to filter the second type of spammers because the
propagandist spammers are more insidious and use various techniques to escape from
spam detection filters in SB systems. Thus detection of such spammers is crucial to
the reliability of SB systems. Generally spammers focus to misuse the popularity and
the high Page Rank of social bookmarking systems for their purposes. Page Rank
is a numeric value which measures how important a page is on the web. Recently
spammers have developed various methods to increase their influence on popular
Websites. Thanks to these recent techniques, they show up frequently on popular,
recent and / or highly ranked Web sites in response to specific tag, searched by
a legitimate user [10]. One of their techniques is to create several accounts and
publish the same post with each of these accounts, resulting in a fake popularity for
the corresponding page. Accordingly, using this technique, they not only appear on
recent pages, but also their bookmarks may appear on pages with high popularity.
Both saboteur and propagandist spammers benefit from this technique. In addition,
spammers sometimes consider diverting tags to some bookmarks or sometimes they
utilize popular tags. One obvious conclusion of what mentioned above is the fact that
spammer detection should be performed at different levels using different techniques
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at each level(user level, resource level and post level). A description of these levels
and corresponding anti-spam strategies, categorized by Heyman et.al [3], is given in
Section 2.4.
3.1 Spam Detection Techniques
At each granularity level there are two options available for the spam detection task.
One option is to construct statistical features from the data set and employ classification
techniques to identify and detect spammers. The other option would be to employ
semantic techniques to analyse the elements of folksonomy or the relations between
them. Our experiments are conducted based on both feature selection and semantic
analysis of folksonomy. We describe different techniques first by defining features for
real time spam detection in SB systems and next we continue our work by semantic
evaluations of folksonomy elements.
3.2 Feature Creation
Here our main goal is to find efficient features which have predictive power to
discriminate spammers from non-spammers. We hypothesize and believe that
examining the activity of users in time domain, in addition to their share tendency
plays a role in identifying spammers. Then we extract features that are based on time
domain and share tendency of users at both user and resource levels.
3.2.1 Time
User inspection is possible by considering user’s activity time slots in the system.
For this purpose we extended the relation definition (Y ) of user, tag and resources in
folksonomies by subjoin of time element L to it. L is the set of all time-stamps (l) on
which users bookmarked resources. The definition has been changed as follows:
Y ⊆U×T ×R×L
Yu ⊆ Y and Yu1 = {< r,Tur, lur > |< u,r,Tur, lur >∈ Y ∧ u = u1}
Lu = {lur|r ∈ Ru}
(3.1)
The elements of Y are again called TAS and a post is a quadruple (u,Tur,r, lur) which
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means that user u added a set of tags T ur to the resource r on the time-stamp lur (lur ∈
Lu).
The definition of the post elements are as follows.
T ur : The set of all tags that user u assigned to the resource r.
lur : the time-stamp on which user u appended tags to the resource r and saved the
resource in the SB system.
Lu : the set of all activity time-stamps of user u in the system.
Y u : the set of all assignments made by user u in the SB system.
We also consider Ru as the set of all resources bookmarked by user
3.2.1.1 Sessions
For better pursuing users we consider the activity sessions of each user. A session
(s) corresponds to the time slot in which a user starts bookmarking in the system
and it ends when the bookmarking activity is finished. The duration of each session
can range between time slots as short as 1 second or as long as 20 hours or even
more. In order to partition user activities into sessions, the time difference between
two consequent time-stamps is subjected to a threshold. If the time difference is more
than the threshold, which can be set to be 30 minutes as in many Web usage mining
studies [18], we hypothesize that the user has started a new session. We consider
activity sessions set (Su) of a user as follows.
Su = {< u,ri,Turi, lriu >,< u,ri+1,Turi+1, lri+1u >,...,< u,rn,Turn , lrnu >};
< ri,Turi, lriu >∈ yu and lri+1u− lri+1u ≤ 30 min
(3.2)
Every user in the system has at least one session.
3.2.1.2 Resource bombardment
We continue our work by investigating in the resource level. Analysing users
interaction with a resource can be helpful to understand the nature of that resource.
Traditionally users of bookmarking systems rely on the pages which used by other
trustful users beforehand. Spammers are aware of this point and want to pretend a high
reliability of their own pages but their resources are full of advertisements and smug
contents which are not attractive for other users. In order to obviate this problem they
trick the system by employing several user accounts to publish the same post for several
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Table 3.1: Time based features.
Feature Name Feature Description
no-Of-big-session Total number of big sessions (sessions take more
than 3 hours) of a user
no-of-res-in-big-sessions Total nomber of resources of a user added to the
system during big sessions
total-during-in-the-system Total time during that the user has
been activated in the system
date-first-activity The time stamp of first
bookmark of a user
company-in-a-bombardment Total times that a user company
in time bombardments
times [10]. When all these accounts start to bookmark the same resources at close
time intervals then it seems that they bombard the resources in a small fraction of time,
namely one hour. In fact what they do is Short Range Resource Bombardment (SRRB).
We analyse the time-stamps related to each resource in the system to catch resources
which attacked by SRRB and group them in the set Rb. To detect the spammers with
this type of bombarding attitude we compute the total partnership of each user in a
bombardment (nb) as follow:
RbL = {< rb, lrb > |rb ∈ Rb and lrb ∈ L} (3.3)
RuL = {< ru, lur > |ru ∈ Ru and lur ∈ Lu} (3.4)
Rbu = RbL∩RuL (3.5)
nb = |Rbu| (3.6)
where RbL is the pair of attacked resources (rb ∈ Rb) and the bombardment
time-stamps l rb corresponding to resource rb.
RuL is the pair of all resources (r ∈ Ru) bookmarked by the user u at time-stamps lur.
Rbu is the pair of all resources that user u has attacked at time-stamps lur (lur = lrb).
A high bombardment partnership (nb) is an indicator of spam behavior in our method.
We extract features by considering sessions and attacked resources and group these
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Table 3.2: Share features.
Feature Name Feature Description
total-bookmarks-in-share Total number of bookmarks in share with other users
total-bibtexes-in-share Total number of bibtexes in share with other users
total-bookmark-company Total number of all share companies form bookmarks
total-bibtex-company Total number of all share companies form bibtexes
features in Table 3.1 with their corresponding description. For each user in the system
the values of these features are calculated and finally we use these values in order to
classify users to spammers or non spammers. Some of these features like having very
big sessions or high amount of participation in bombardment are clear signs of spam
activity.
3.2.2 Share
In the SB systems some pages turn out to be reference pages on a specific subject. For
example when an individual wants to acquire information about Leukemia disease,
she/he bookmarks the "http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Leukemia". This page contains
some basic information about Leukemia and after a while other users with the same
intention may bookmark this resource as well. It seems that there is a resource sharing
among users who bookmark the same resource. We investigate the resource share
tendency of all users in the system to use it as an efficient feature in our spam detection
model.
3.2.2.1 Share percentage
For measuring the share tendency of users in a more efficient way, we calculate the
share percentage (spu) of each user as follow:
spui =
|ShRui|
|Rui|
(3.7)
ShRui = {r|< ui,Tuir,r, luir >∈ Y and < u j,Tu jr,r, lu jr >∈ Y} (3.8)
where ui,u j ∈U and ui 6= u j and |ShRu| is the total number of all shared resources of
each user. We extract features by considering share tendency of users which are shown
in table 3.2.
In this work our data set contains two types of content: (1) bookmark entry for
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Figure 3.1: An example of share bombardment.
sharing URL resources; (2) BibTeX entry for sharing publication references. Based
on this fact, when we consider a feature definition we define it for bookmarks and
bibtexes separately to remain loyal to the assumption made in our data set. The more
information about data set are in section 4.1 and the number of users, Tags, resources,...
are shown in table 4.1.
3.2.2.2 Share bombardment
One of the techniques which propagandist spammers use often is to employ various
user accounts. They use these accounts to inject spam at simultaneous time slots which
results in a SRRB. According to this, we can detect them by an SRRB filter in the
resource level. In Figure 3.1 we explain such spammer activity. The propagandist
user u1 enlists user accounts u2,u3,u4 to bookmark a set of resources r1,r2,r3, ...r7.
If these user accounts choose different activity times then SRRB filter fails to detect
them as spammers. But by deeper investigation of such behaviors we observed that
such asynchronous attacks end up in construction of colonies which can be divided
into two types: (1) A small set of users who share a big colony of resources; (2)
A big colony of users which share a small set of resources. In both circumstances
a ResourceShareBombardment (RSB) occurs from user side to the resources. This
means that the users wants to increase the visibility of resources. Then an informal type
of share behavior will be happened. It seems that a share bombardment has append in
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Table 3.3: Statistical Features.
Feature Name Feature Description
no-bookmark-more-m-tags Total number of bookmarks that have more than m tags
total-no-bookmarks Total number of bookmarks of a user
total-no-tags Total number of different tags of a user
total-no-bibtexes Total number of bibtexes of a user
this condition. To extract these type of irregular behaviors we use again the parameters
we defined previously in addition to some new definitions.
Let Cu be the set of partners of a user u and ShRu be the set of shared resources and
R( f ree,u) be the non shared resources (R( f ree,u) = Ru \ ShRu) of that user. Then we
define Share Bombardment Ratio (SHb) of each user as follows.
SHb =

|ShRu|
|Cu|∗log |R( f ree,u)| if ShRu > |Cu|
|Cu|
|ShRu|∗log |R( f ree,u)| if ShRu < |Cu|
(3.9)
Where |Cu| is the number of partners of user u. The intuition behind this is to fetch
out the cases where either a small numbers of users share a large amount of resources
(high |ShRu||Cu| ) or where a certain resources is shared among many users (low
|ShRu|
|Cu| ).
The former indicates a suspicious behaviour amid directing search engines to those
resources while the latter indicates an attempt to increase the popularity of a page
using several accounts by a single spammer. In both cases the ratio of |ShRu| to |Cu|
peaks whereas for a normal user, this ratio is rather more proportionate and results in
a small value for SHb.
In fact, we use SHb as a measure of the RSB filter in the user level of our spam
detection model. One can easily see that in Eq.3.9, if Cu is less than the number
of shared resources (SHb) then we can conclude that few number of dedicated users
are bombarding so many resources. Inversely when the number of Cu is very higher
than shared resources (SHb) this means that some users are dedicated to bombard
few special resources. In both cases SHb will have a high value. We also pay
attention to free resources of each user which are not in common with others. Taking
only shared resources into account, will make a confusion between the spammer and
non-spammers since the effect of the common resources plays a dominating role in
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the value of SHb. This is why normalizing the SHb by the log of the number of free
resources reduces the effect of the common and popular resources which are being
used both by spammers and non-spammers.
Looking at the share tendency features, introduced so far, one could realize that in some
cases where spammers and non-spammers demonstrate a similar sharing behaviour,
the discriminative power of these features may decrease. This is due to the fact that
these features have high statistical correlation with the underlying data which is not
considered in the construction of share tendency features. To clarify this situation,
suppose that there are different users with equal total number of sessions. Some of
these users are spammers and some of them are not. The session number alone is not
enough to discriminate between the two groups of users. However if we consider a
new feature like the total number of resources of the user, which is highly interrelated
to the number of sessions, we will be able to discriminate between spammers and
non-spammers. As mentioned earlier in the Introduction section, spammers frequently
change from high activity/tagging to low activity/tagging. Since the spammers tend
to use more unrelated but populated tags in SB systems we also consider posts with
more than a predefined number of tags as a sign of suspicious activity in our statistical
features. These new set of features which are represented in Table 3.3 tend to show
their influence on the overall performance in such extreme situations. Hence, they
prevent the spammer users to deceive the filtering system by resembling the behavior
of a non-spammer user.
3.3 Semantic Analysis
In the previous section we extracted some features in both user and resource levels
to determine spam activities in the SB systems. As we mentioned earlier, the most
efficient technique for spam detection in the Web is the semantic analysis of Web
objects. For example in [3] it has been expressed that for such methods, we can treat the
data set as a set of objects with interrelated attributes. For instance in email spam, the
messages can be considered as objects and the headers as attributes. In Web spam, the
Web pages are objects, and attributes might be in-links from other pages, out-links to
other pages, page contents and meta-data. But in social bookmarking systems objects
are few, such as photos or URL’s, and the attributes are comments and tags assigned
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to them respectively. In the semantic analysis of these situations the relations between
the objects, attributes or between objects or attributes are considered.
In the semantic analysis of SB systems we analyze the relationship of different objects
in the system too. Here the main objects of our work space are User, Tag and Resource.
Identifying spammers in a tagging environment with thousands of users and millions
of tag assignments and resources and so many relationships between these objects can
be done by exploiting the theory of wisdom of the crowds [19]. James Surowiecki
describes this simple idea that has profound concepts: "large groups of people are
smarter than few elites, no matter how brilliant or fast in solving problems, bringing
innovation, coming to wise decisions, even prognostication of the future" [20]. This
means that we can trust to the results emerged from a population. Now in our work
space the population would be the users which have similar activities toward the
other objects. For example if many known spammers use a certain tag for a certain
resource, it might indicate that other users having the same tag behaviour are also
spammers. This theory comes to the mind from the famous Page Rank theory. For
better understanding and because our proposed method rely on Page Rank, we will
have a brief overview on this theory.
3.3.1 Page Rank
The intuition behind Page Rank theory is that a Web page would have high rank
in comparison with other pages if several important Web pages have in-links to it.
Accordingly, Page Rank is based on a mutual reinforcement between pages, that is,
the importance of a certain page influences and is being influenced by the importance
of some other neighbour pages. For example considering the Figure 3.2 We model the
Web pages m, p,q,n as a graph. The graph G = (V ,E ) consists of a set (V ) of N
pages (nodes) and a set of directed links (E ) which connects pages together. In the
Web world a page p may have multiple out-links to page q like as (p,q) ∈ E . Then
each page may have in-links or out-links or both. For example in the Figure 3.2 the
number of in-links of page q is 1 where out-links is equal to 2. The in-degree ß(p)
of a node (page) is the number of in-links to that node (page) and ω(p) is the number
of out-links from that page. Consequently, Page Rank measures the probability with
which a user is able to access a certain node (page) from the current node (page). The
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Figure 3.2: A simple Web graph.
more trusted the destination node (page) is the higher the probability measured by Page
Rank method will be. Thus a node with a high in-link degree can be considered as a
trusted node and such a page attracts a large number of users. The Page Rank score
r of a page, which is a value proportional to the probability measured by Page Rank
method is defined [24] as:
r = εe+(1− ε)x (3.10)
Here e is the distribution of Web pages that a random surfer perodicaly jump to and it
can be any non - negative vector. x is the Markovian random walk distribution and ε is
the decay factor and imply that with a probability 1−ε the existing links are following
or with probability ε a non linked page would be the subject to follow.
3.3.2 Trust Rank for bookmarking systems
By using the concept of Page Rank, Trust Rank technique for spam detection in social
bookmarking systems has been introduced as follows [19] .
t− ranki+1 = α.T.t− ranki +(1−α).d (3.11)
Here T is the transition matrix, α is the weighting factor and d is a seed set and
t − ranki+1 is the score vector of all users. The transition matrix consists of similarity
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Figure 3.3: A tagging graph example.
degrees between users. The seed set consists the set of users which the rest of users of
the system are accessible from them. The score vector is the final result of Trust Rank
system which reveals the number of accessible users and their natures Given a data set
from a SB system containing users (U), tags(T ) and resources(R) we model our data
as a bi-directed weighted graph G = (V ,E ). The vertices v ∈ V represents a user. In
this graph the edges of the graph E indicates that two users ui ,u j used at least one
common resource or tag. Additionally, we associate a weight to each edge so that the
weight of an edge imply the number of shared elements of the end nodes of the edge.
We compute the weight assigned to each edge as follow:
W (vi,v j) =W (ui,u j) = (Tui ∩Tu j)+(Rui ∩Ru j)+(T Rui ∩T Ru j) (3.12)
where Tui is the set of tags of User ui, Rui is the set of resources of User u and T Rui is
the set of resource and corresponding tag pairs of each user.
In Figure 3.3 we present a simple example of tagging scenario in a bookmarking
system. We have users U = {u1,u2,u3,u4,u5,u6} , Tags T = {t1, t2, t3, t4, t5, t6} and
resources R = {r1,r2,r3,r4,r5}. Each user has at least one annotated tag to a resource.
Based on the tag assignments in this scenario, the resulting data model of users is
shown below in Table 3.4.Six nodes, representing the six users are connected with
each other according to common pairs.
Based on this graph model, we introduce a transition matrix T , which is defined as:
T (i, j) =
{
0 if (vi,v j /∈ E )
W (vi,v j)
sumvk∈V
if (vi,v j ∈ E ) (3.13)
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Table 3.4: Tag, resource and tag-resource pairs of users.
user-id Tag set Resource set Tag-Resource
u1 {t1, t3} {r1,r3} {t1r1, t3r3}
u2 {t1, t2, t5} {r1,r3} {t1r1, t2r1, t5r3}
u3 {t3, t4, t5} {r1,r2,r3} {t3r1, t3r3, t4r3, t5r2}
u4 {t4, t5, t6} {r4,r5} {t4r5, t5r4, t6r4}
u5 {t6} {r4,r5} {t6r4, t6r5}
u6 {t6} {r4,r5} {t6r4, t6r5}
Adjacency matrix is a sparse matrix with n rows and n clumns where n corresponds to
the number of users. The element of this matrix can be calculated using Eq.3.12. The
adjacency matrix for the 6 users shown in Figure 3.3 can be calculated as follows

0 4 4 0 0 0
4 0 3 1 0 0
4 3 0 2 0 0
0 1 2 0 4 4
0 0 0 4 0 5
0 0 0 4 5 0
 (3.14)
Using the transition matrix construction scheme, presented in Eq.3.13 we are now able
to construct a transition matrix for the above mentioned scenario. The transition matrix
for the data set shown in Figure 3.3 is:

0 12
1
2 0 0 0
1
2 0
3
8
1
8 0 0
4
9
3
9 0
2
9 0 0
0 111
2
11 0
4
11
4
11
0 0 0 49 0
5
9
0 0 0 49
5
9 0
 (3.15)
This transition matrix is an asymmetric matrix whereas the adjacency matrix is
symmetrical due to the fact that the graph has a bi-directed model. The asymmetric
characteristic of the transition matrix is a result of different values for the same
neighborhood in two different directions. In fact it includes the similarities between
users(nodes) in the SB system. More similarity between nodes result more dense
matrix.
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3.3.3 Propagation using seed set in Trust Rank technique
Trust Rank technique contains a seed set (d)which consists of users with known and
unknown class labels.It used to propagate scores during the iterations in order to
estimate the class labels of unknown users. Equipped with the scoring system which
assigns positive and negative scores to non-spammers and spammers respectively, a
system can compute a general score for each user which results the score vector
(t− ranki+1). Please note that, a negative score for each user in the final t− ranki+1
vector does not imply a definite spammer label for that user and vice versa. However,
the more the score assigned to a user approaches the extreme boundaries of the score
range, the more probable it gets to assign a correct label to that user. For instance if the
score assigned to a user approaches to the negative boundary, it indicates that the user
has a high degree of relationship with malicious users and thus it can be considered as
a threat. Briefly the scores can be interpreted as a confidence value which helps the
automatic flagging of users at user level spam detection. Based on our main line of
discussion, the initial seed vector d would be initialized as follow:
d(ui) =
{
O(ui) i f (ui ∈ SEED)
0 i f (ui /∈ SEED) (3.16)
Where O(ui) ∈ −1,0,1 is the oracle function which assigns initial score 1 to
non-spammers, -1 to spammers and 0 to the unknown users. Here SEED ⊆U is the
set of seed nodes which should have been chosen manually.
Consider the running example in Figure 3.3 and status of the users. We consider
(u1,u2) as non-spammers and (u5,u6) as spammers. The users (u3,u4) would be
unknown users which we want to determine their label by employing the Trust Rank
method. Then our seed set would be as vector below. The size of vector is equal to the
number of all users in the SB system.

+1
+1
0
0
−1
−1
 (3.17)
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After 10 iterations the trust scores of each user can be seen in vector below.

+1
+1
+3.5
−3.5
−3
−3
 (3.18)
As can be seen in the vector above, since user u3 is linked more to non-spammer users,
it achieves a positive score whereas u4 gets a negative score due to its extensive relation
with spammer users.
3.3.4 Improvements on the technique
In order to improve the Trust Rank technique two main elements, T and d which
correspond to the transition matrix and seed vector respectively are subject to
modification. Modification of these two elements will yield an improvement on both
seed set selection and coverage ratio problems in Trust Rank technique.
3.3.4.1 Seed set improvements
In our proposed method finding good seeds and using them to propagate scores of
other users play a key role in spam detection performance. A large seed set increases
the complexity of our approach whereas a small seed set leaves some important links
unattended resulting in a low coverage ratio. Our main goal is to generate a seed set
which covers a reasonably large portion of links while maintaining low computational
complexity along with high accuracy in classifying users. That is, our contribution
in this thesis is to decrease the size of the seed set while considering the coverage
ability of our seed set. This means that we should decrease the seed set size in a way
that we can cover as many users in the test set as possible. Following the same criteria
considered in [19], namely decreasing the size of the seed set and demonstrating higher
coverage of the data, we utilized our novel feature set as the input to a Support Vector
Machine (SVM) to generate support vectors as our modified seed set. The resulting
seed set, as will be discussed further in experimental results, is small and covers a large
portion of the test data set. Our proposed seed function selection algorithm is shown
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in Algorithm. 1. The resulted seed set consists of both spammers and non spammers.
In order to calculate the final results and finding the dependencies between test users
and spammer or non spammers, the test users are added to the seed set too.
Algorithm 1 Proposed seed function selection method.
Require: U User
Require: T Tags
Require: R Resources
Require: L Time stamp
return returns s, seed set
F = ExtractFeatures(U,T,R,L)
s = SV M(F)
return s
All unknown users of test set are added to this vector too.
3.3.4.2 Coverage improvement
One of the other problems of Trust Rank method is the coverage which is an evaluation
criteria here. The higher the number of accessible nodes from a seed node in the
transition matrix, the higher the coverage value will be. Accessibility reflects the
relationship (in terms of common resources, tags or tag-resource pairs) between
neighbouring nodes. For example, in Figure 3.4, the edges (defined in Section 3.3.2)
represent the similarity between the nodes. Having a good similarity criteria and a
well chosen seed vector from the training set, a larger portion of test nodes will be
accessible. Moreover, when a node in the midway between a seed node and some
other nodes is isolated it will cut off the accessibility of the seed node and decreases
the coverage. The ideal seed set is supposed to cover all the corresponding nodes.
However maximum coverage yields a huge seed set which burdens the algorithm with
high computation cost. In this sense a good seed set would be the one with a reasonably
large coverage and computationally cheap size. Moreover, seed set is not the only
determining factor in the performance of spam detection. Neighbourhood operators,
say, similarity criteria, have an enormous effect on the performance. Suppose that we
already have the ideal seed set while our similarity measure is not perfect in the sense
that it might prevent some seed nodes to gain access to some other node. It could
also be the case that a node is isolated and does not have any neighbours at all. In both
cases, either the definition of similarity ignores some nodes and decreases the coverage
by changing the edges of the graph or the neighbourhood structure is insufficient to
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Figure 3.4: A simple coverage map by seed set
cover all the nodes. This decreases the spam detection performance, no matter if we
have the ideal seed set or not. For example in Figure 3.4 the user (u1) can not cover the
user (u6) based on the similarity matrix which we defined previously. That is why we
have employed cosine similarity measure in order to evaluate all users in the test set.
Given two vectors of users features, the cosine similarity can be expressed as the
following equation.
θn,s =
Fs ·Fn
||Fs|| · ||Fn|| (3.19)
where Fs and Fn are the feature vectors of the seed nodes and the non-known node
respectively. These features are defined in detail in Section 3.2. For all users in the
test set we compute the cosine similarity to spammer and non-spammer seed nodes
according to Eq.3.19 and find the maximum similarity.
Score = argmaxs{θn,s} (3.20)
Then, the score of the user node is replaced with the maximum cosine similarity value
(computed in Eq.3.20).
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Figure 3.5: URL and host addresses
In order to modify the transition matrix, we analysed the role of shared hosts instead of
shared resources between users too. This is in contrast to the method proposed in [19]
where only tags, resources and their combination was used to maintain coverage over
users. For instance, considering the url addresses in Figure 3.5, one can observe that
users u1,u2,u3 and u4 do not have a common resource (url). However, considering the
host names of those url addresses, one can easily see that these users share a common
host. Accordingly, their similarity increases and accessing one of these users yields a
higher probability of accessing all of those who have a shared host. That is, the share
rate (ShRu) increases when we consider the host addresses instead of consideration
exact url addresses.
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4. EXPERIMENTS
In the previous section we proposed two main spam detection techniques. We report
our experiments in using this methods. First of all we describe our data set.
4.1 Data Set Description
For the spam detection we used publicly available data from ECML/PKDD 2008
discovery challenge [21]. The data set contains all the annotations of users of
del.icio.us bookmarking system [15]. It includes two separate training and test sets.
The data in each set consists of bookmarks and Bibtexes where a Bibtex is a citation
assigned to a certain scientific publication. In the training data set 29,248 of users are
manually labelled as spammers and the remaining 2,467 as legitimate users. The test
data set is including 171 non spammer and 7033 spammers. More details of the data
set is given in Table 4.1.
Table 4.1: Data set.
Tag Assignments of training data set 16,818,699
Spam Tag Assignments in training data set 13,258,759
Tag Assignments of test data set 2,743,743
Bookmarks of Training data set 1,943,880
Bookmarks of Test data set 141,173
Bibtexes of Training data set 158,629
Bibtexes of Test data set 65,839
The data set is extremely unbalanced in the sense that the number of spammer users
both in training and test data sets are much higher than that of non-spammer users in
contrast to the real world case (specially in the test data set). This makes the data set
potential to over-fitting in favor of spammers when pattern recognition methods are
considered for discriminative analysis. Moreover, the data set contains concatenated
tag values and it makes it harder to process the data set. Obviously, prior to any
further processing there is a need to prepare the data set for feature extraction and
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discriminative analysis. Here in this work we just work on tags. In further works,
preprocessing on the other attributes can be considered too.
4.1.1 Data preparation
The data set used in this study should be preprocessed before using it as input to the
proposed model. The necessary preprocessing steps taken in this work to address this
issue are as follow:
• All the tags are converted into lower-case format.
• Removing special characters from tags: Characters like "/, ?, >, <, @, !, ..." are
treated as undesired characters and replaced with blank in tags. If the resulting
string is segmented into two or more separate strings, those new strings are added
again to the tag set and the old string is erased from the tag set.
• Host names are extracted from the data set. These host names are stored in a
secondary buffer and used later in our experiments.
• Plural terms in tags were converted into their corresponding singular terms.
4.2 Experimental design
After defining concepts such as activity sessions and share tendency of each user,
we extracted the desired features and we computed scores for them in order to train
our model. Finally we want to do a classification on our test data and evaluate
the performance of our offered model. For implementing different classification
techniques we have used Weka software library [22].
4.2.1 Feature based evaluation
Figure 4.1 reveals the differences of share tendency between normal users and
spammers in user level analysis. The presented difference is compatible with our
definition of RSB filter measure in Eq.3.9. As can be seen, the sharing tendency of
spammer users, in the area between 1% to 60% is lower than that of non-spammers.
This is due to the fact that the resources added by spam users usually don’t catch
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Figure 4.1: Share tendency analysis of users
attention from normal users. As discussed before, since the normal users activity
and sharing tendency rely on some popular Web pages, spammers usually tag these
reference Web pages to mislead filters. On the other hand, spammers tend to use a
series of user accounts to share a sequence of their own resources in order to pretend
a high reliability of these resources. They do this in two ways, by enlisting a large
number of accounts to bombard few number of resources or enlisting few users to
bombard a large number of resources. This is to say that, they either have a high Cu
value comparing to ShRu or a low Cu value comparing to ShRu in Eq.3.9 respectively.
Both conditions yield a high value for SHb where a share bombardment occurs and as
can be observed in right hand side of the Figure 4.1, more than 58% of all users who
shared more than 90% of their resources are spammers whereas only 8% of normal
users shared more than 90% of their resources. Note that the threshold for the feature
no-bookmark-more-m-tags is set to be m = 15 in our experiments. This value has been
chosen due to our observations from the data set which indicates that 90% of users
with more than 15 tags in each bookmark are mainly spammers.
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Figure 4.2: Resource bombardment analysis
In resource level analysis, as can be seen in Figure 4.2, when considering a short
time slot like one hour, most of the bombardment of resources are performed by
spammers. In this figure, the x axis represents the resources of RbL in Eq.3.3. Here
each bombarded resource rb, has owners (some of which are spammers and some are
not). The y axis represents the ratio between the number of spammer owners of the
resource to the total number of its owners. For example 100% of the users who attacked
a resource for 150 times in one hour are shown to be spammers in Figure 4.2. However,
we can see that non-spammers are considered to be suspicious users when the number
of attacks on a resource is not much. Sometimes propagandist spammers bookmark
common resources with normal users to escape the filters. Most of these spammers use
the currently bookmarked resources in the system by other users and then it seems that
the normal users also are partners in resource bombardment.
Measuring the series of time-stamp values (l) of a new resource within the time
threshold (one hour) in the SB system makes real time detection of spam resources
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possible with minimum computation cost.
To have a better picture of user activities in the system we constructed the set of all
activity sessions for each user. We considered the sessions with more than 3 hours
duration as abnormally big sessions. When we investigated in our data set we found
that approximately more than 10% of spammers have at least one big session whereas
just less than 0.3% of all normal users have experienced such sessions. This is due to
the fact that spammers often initiate a session and start to tag resources in an automatic
manner, using a software. A normal user with human capacities is rarely able to
perform in this way.
4.2.2 Semantic based evaluation
Using SVM classification technique we obtained seed users from training set and
formed our seed set. This seed set includes 3579 users among 31,715 users. It
also includes 1994 spammer users and 1585 non-spammer user. We conducted four
different experiments using the seed set provided by the SVM technique. In the first
round of experiments the similarity between tags of users in the test set and seed set
were calculated. This results in a similarity matrix on which 10 Trust Rank iterations
were performed to cover the users in the system. This operation results in a vector of
scores for covered users. Non-covered users are assigned a score of 0. The resulted
scores are then fed to a naive Bayes classifier to discriminate between spammers and
non-spammers. In the next three rounds of experiments, only the input to the similarity
function is changed where users resources, tag-resource pairs and hosts are considered
for measuring their similarity to the corresponding element in the seed set. In fact we
just change the similarity matrix and the seed set remains without any change.
In order to expand the range of our comparisons, we also considered to replace the
similarity measure with a method, namely cosine similarity (Section 3.3.4.2), which
provides a higher coverage. We calculate the cosine similarity between each user in
the test set with users in the training set and construct a transition matrix. We use
this transition matrix in the Trust Rank equation with a seed set which includes all the
users in the training set. This combination of transition matrix and seed set will result
a high amount of coverage. To decrease the complexity in terms of time and space
we performed another experiment with the seed sets replaced by those provided by
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the SVM classifier. The resulting scores for both experiments are later fed to a Naive
Bayes classifier to discriminate between spammers and non-spammers.
4.3 Experimental results
4.3.1 Results of feature based experiments
After the data preparation stage of our spam detection model we performed different
classification experiments by Weka. We use Naive Bayes, multilayer perceptron,
Bayes net, J48 classification techniques in order to evaluate our method. As discussed
in section 4.1.3 our features seems to be highly interrelated to each other. For example
the total number of all resources of each user is dependent to the total number of
all sessions of that user. Thus, for the classification phase, we should choose a
classifier which is capable of analysing this correlation. It seems that Bayes Network
Figure 4.3: Plot of ROC area by different classifiers
Classification would be the best choice due to its superior classification performance
(Figure 4.3). Bayesian networks provide a means of parsimoniously expressing joint
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probability distributions over many interrelated attributes. A major advantage of
Bayesian network over many other types of predictive models, is that the Bayesian
network structure represents the inter-relationships among the data set attributes [23].
Different classification techniques and their results are shown in Table 4.2. To
understand the results better, Figure 4.3 shows the ROC (Receiver Operating
Characteristic) plot1 of different classifiers employed in our experiment. As we
expected the best classifier with an AUC of 0.894 is the Bayes Network. Table 4.2
shows the confusion matrix which resulted by Bayes Network classification. A brief
description of evaluation methods is given in appendix A1,A2.
In the test data set of ECML/PKDD the ratio of non spammers to spammers is low
(170/7034). Due to the low ratio between the number of non-spammers to that of
spammers, many studies on this data set fail to provide a spammer detection framework
with a reasonable confusion matrix. Their models are often over-fitting and a large
portion of non-spammer users are classified as spammers. As an example it has been
reported a false detection of 158 normal users as spammers [19]. In our method
however, a much lower false positive (69) is achieved as can be seen in Table 4.3.
Table 4.2: Accuracy results on test data set.
Classifier Precision F-Measure AUC
Naive Bayes 0.978 0.989 0.597
Bayes Network 0.99 0.993 0.894
Multi Layer Perceptron 0.977 0.988 0.822
J48 0.989 0.993 0.832
Table 4.3: Confusion matrix.
Actual/Labled Spammer Normal User
Spammer 7003 31
Normal User 69 102
We also checked our method on just training set which the ratio of non-spammers
to spammers is a little bit high (2467/29248). The evaluation involves 10-fold
cross-validation. Bayes network results has been improved in terms of AUC curve
in table 4.4 .
1The evaluation methods (confusion matrix, ROC Area, F-Measure) are described in details in
Appendix A1,A2
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Table 4.4: Accuracy results on training data set
Classifier Precision F-Measure AUC
Naive Bayes 0.954 0.954 0.798
Bayes Network 0.967 0.976 0.915
Multi Layer Perceptron 0.944 0.969 0.796
J48 0.965 0.98 0.778
Probably the unbalanced test data set caused this difference in AUC values.
In this work our concentration on resource level yields a spam resource filter which can
be used to detect spam resources. This filter can also be used in every bookmarking
system for real-time detection of new appended spam resources and therefore provides
flexibility.
Understanding the behaviour of a user in the system is possible when the user has
more than one or two posts. But independent of the data set or SB system in use, there
are always newcomers with only one resource. For example 29% of all users in our
data set just have one resource in the system. Sifting spammers from normal users
without using of semantic spam detection techniques seems impossible here. But most
of semantic techniques are also dependent to the common tags or resources between
users and few number of common elements yields inefficient results. For example
in [4] when they eliminated users with few posts in their experiments the results turned
to be better. But still our SRRB and SBR filters act successfully in this case. We
calculate the nb and SHb for every user here.
As we before said we categorized spammers into saboteurs and propagandists. During
the investigation of the system, we consider some features as sign of saboteur users.
These features deal with clear signs of spam activities. We also consider some features
to catch propagandist users too. Table 4.5 presents these different filters.
Table 4.5: Saboteur and propagandist users.
Spammer Type Feature Name Number of Spammers
Saboteur # big session 286
Saboteur # resources with more than 15 tags 1643
Propagandist company in bombardment (nb > 0) 822
Propagandist (SHb > 0) 2560
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Table 4.6: Semantic experiments.
Test name Seed set Similarity measure
A1 all the users in training set # common resources
A2 all the users in training set # common tags
A3 all the users in training set # common tag-resource pairs
A4 all the users in training set # common host names
B1 provided by SVM # common resources
B2 provided by SVM # common tags
B3 provided by SVM # common tag-resource pairs
B4 provided by SVM # common host names
C1 all the users in training set # cosine similarity between feature
vectors of test and seed users
C2 provided by SVM # cosine similarity between feature
vectors of test and seed users
Table 4.7: Experimental results.
Test name TP FP TN FN ROC Coverage
A1 1218 18 31 30 0.804 18%
A2 5657 92 67 1299 0.710 98%
A3 512 2 8 11 0.889 0.7%
A4 3165 20 117 208 0.951 3510
B1 368 13 14 25 0.727 48%
B2 1476 10 149 5480 0.574 98%
B3 97 5 2 8 0.605 0.1%
B4 1775 3 124 466 0.933 33%
C1 4353 109 62 2681 0.491 100%
C2 3065 33 138 3969 0.621 100%
When we run investigate on this huge data set we catch 9.8% of spammers who have
just one resource in the system (with nb = 1 and SHb > 1). These spammers are also
propagandist spammers who enlist different user accounts in order to send the same
post several times in different time-stamps to the system.
4.3.2 Results of semantic based experiments
As outlined in Section 4.2.2, multiple experiments have been conducted on the data set.
Table 4.6 provides a brief summary of these experiments and their distinctions. Table
4.7 shows the test results, including confusion matrix, ROC Area and the coverage ratio
whereas the coverage ratio is introduced in Section 3.3.4.2. According to the results
in Table 4.7, one can notice that experiments A2 and B2 resulted in the best coverage
ratio among other experiments while their ROC Areas are not the highest ones. Best
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ROC Area is offered by experiments A4 and B4 where number of common host names
where considered as the similarity measure. Two types of spammers, namely saboteur
and propagandist, were introduced in Section 2.3. As discussed earlier, saboteur users
are more insidious and misuse popular tags in their own resources to mislead the search
engines as well as other users in order to direct Web traffic towards their own resources.
Using popular tags increases their resemblance to normal users in that they both use
the same group of tags which raises no suspicions at all in systems utilizing A2 or B2.
This is due to the fact that A2 or B2 both rely on tag content and are easily deceived
by such saboteur users. On the other hand, A4 and B4 methods rely on host names for
which saboteur users have no strategy against. As a consequence, these types of users
are exposed to A4 and B4 and hence an increase in ROC Area. On the other hand, since
the neighbourhood in the tag space is much more dense than that of host space, the
coverage ratio corresponding to tags is higher. The reason behind this is the fact that
two different users may assign common tags to various resources while the resources
may not belong to the same host.
As was described in Section 3.3.4.2, the similarity measure plays a key role on the
coverage ratio. This is clearly observable when A1 and B1 are compared to A4 and B4.
The immediate outcome of this comparison is that, choosing number of common hosts
as the measure of similarity increased the coverage. The reason is that the similarity
measure based on host names extends the scope of similarity since two users which
share the same host may not have a similar number of resources as in A1 or B1. This
relaxation on the definition of similarity increases the coverage while maintaining a
reasonable distinction between the neighbourhood regions hence a quite good ROC
Area.
Further investigating in the results, one can see that A3 offer the worst coverage ratio
among other methods of the group while its ROC Area is the second best. This is
due to the principle that was discussed in Section 3.3. That is, when a common tag
is assigned by numerous users to a certain resource, a common consensus emerges
which is trustworthy in the sense that the common tag-resource is valid. However,
though trustworthy, such a combination has a small probability and that is why a lower
coverage ratio is achieved. As for B3, it follows the same principle as in A3, however,
due to the low number of seed nodes the coverage ratio is very low.
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Table 4.7 also reflects the difference in performance when seed set is modified. The
philosophy behind conducting Group B experiments is to decrease the size of the seed
set by using the SVM technique in order to decrease the complexity in terms of time
and space while maintaining a reasonable high coverage ratio compared to Group A
experiments. Looking at the results in Table 4.7 we can see that for cases where number
of common tags is considered as similarity measure, decreasing the size of the seed
set has no effect at all in the coverage ratio. However, the ROC Area has decreased
sharply. Training any classifier on a decreased set of samples (seed set) results in
rapid convergence without adequate generalization. That is why, while the coverage is
maintained, say, all insidious spammers that were accessed in A2 experiment are also
accessible in B2 experiment, their behaviour patterns are not discovered adequately.
This is also the case where the similarity measure is consisted of number of common
resources and tag-resource pairs. However, in cases where number of common hosts is
considered as similarity measure, the ROC Area does not experience a sharp decrease.
This is not in contradiction to our recent conclusion that a decrease in size of the
training set does not offer adequate patterns. In fact since insidious spammers, do
not perform manoeuvre on host names, thus the pattern is preserved when host names
are considered for similarity measure. This yields the conclusion that decreasing the
training data set does not affect the accuracy of the model when similarity measure is
well designed.
In order to have a picture of an ideal coverage and evaluate all users in the test set we
proposed the experiments C1,C2. Considering these results, we have an ideal coverage
of 7205 users (all users in the work space). In addition considering the ROC Area of
C2 which we used SVM to select seed users there, yields good result again.
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5. CONCLUSIONS
In this thesis we have approached the spammer detection problem from two different
perspectives (feature extraction, semantic analysis). First we have proposed a novel set
of features with high discriminative power. In order to construct our new feature set,
we have investigated the user behaviour in social bookmarking systems in time and
share domains.
In the time domain, our feature set consists of number of sessions, the duration with
which a user keeps the session alive and the resource number that the user adds
in that session. Also the feature set is sensitive to bombardment activities. These
bombardment streaks can be extracted by considering the user activity in different time
sessions. Using time-based features the framework is able to operate both in user-level
and resource-level to find the bombardier users and bombarded resource. The high
amount of bombarding ratio shows a strong proof of spam existence.
In share domain, we have investigated on the share behavior of the users by measuring
their common resources. Here again we encounter with another type of bombardment.
There, the small colony of users which share a high amount of resources is a sign of
spam. Inversely a big colony of users who share a few number of resources between
themselves have been considered as spammers too.
Using these feature set which extracted in time and share domains, a new framework
for spam detection was developed which is real-time with a high accuracy.
As for semantic analysis we chose Trust Rank method as the baseline for
our experiments and improvements. We chose Trust Rank method due to the
comprehensive picture that it provides from the system. Also, this method operates
in user-level which enables us to identify spammers in that level and results in a
prevention of spammer activities in the system. We improved the coverage ratio of
the Trust Rank method by employing host names in addition to tags, resources and
tag-resource pairs which were already employed in earlier frameworks. Also we
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modified the Trust Rank method in terms of offering a new method which utilizes
a compact seed set which is much smaller than that of the original Trust Rank method.
SVM classifier was employed to generate such a compact seed set. Moreover we
wanted to have a picture of ideal coverage ratio of the system. Then we utilize the
cosine similarity of feature values of the users.
Our experiments show that using of host names in construction of similarity matrix
of the Trust Rank method, increases the accuracy and coverage ratio of the system.
Moreover, the compact seed resulted by SVM, decreases the time and space complexity
of the system. Moreover by utilizing the cosine similarity of extracted features
between users, the picture of an ideal coverage in the system was emerged. Numerous
experiments were conducted and our claims are validated through these experiments.
Overall, our contributions in feature extraction and improvements on Trust Rank
method for spam detection in SB systems can be expanded. Currently, we are working
on efficient and discriminative features. In addition modifying the seed set and
transition matrix of the Trust Rank method is subject of future work.
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APPENDIX A.1
A confusion matrix (Kohavi and Provost, 1998) contains information about the results
of a classification technique. Performance of such technique is commonly evaluated
using the data in this matrix. For a two class classifier, the confusion matrix can be
seen in Figure 6.1.
Figure 6.1: Confusion matrix
The entries in the confusion matrix have the following meanings:
• TP: (True-Positive) is the number of correct predictions that an instance is positive.
• FN: (False-Negative) is the number of incorrect predictions that an instance is
negative.
• FP: (False-Positive) is the number of incorrect predictions that an instance is
positive.
• TN: (True-Negative) is the number of correct predictions that an instance is
negative.
In order to compare the results of different classification techniques, Recall, precision
and F-measure are good criteria. Their definition is as follows.
• Recall: The percentage of positive labelled instances that were predicted as positive.
(
T P
T P+FN
)
• Precision:The percentage of positive predictions that are correct. ( T P
T P+FP
)
• F-measure: The harmonic mean of precision and recall which used to measure the
performance of a classification technique. (2∗recall∗precisionrecall+precision )
APPENDIX A.2
A receiver operating characteristics (ROC) graph is a metric to evaluate the quality of
the output of a classifier. It is shown by plotting the fraction of true positives out of the
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positives (TPR = true positive rate:
T P
T P+FN
) vs. the fraction of false positives out of
the negatives (FPR = false positive rate:
FP
T N +FP
). A plot of ROC Area can be seen
in Figure 6.2.
Figure 6.2: A sample ROC Area
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